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]abs[Abstract 
]p[The history of patents in the health field has been characterized by conflicts and exceptions 
since the early nineteenth century. Many states, both in Europe and in the global South, excluded 
medicines and medical methods from patenting for a long time, while the codes of ethics of 
medical organizations and faculties proscribed patenting by doctors and scientists. Today the 
pharmaceutical industry patents more innovations than any other, and is also the industry whose 
patenting practices are challenged the most by states and civil society. Contrary to the postulates 
of jurists who believed that the industrialization of pharmaceuticals and the growth of 
investments in research unquestionably justified the patenting of medicines under common 
patent laws, the normalization of medicine patents was rapidly called into question by the AIDS 
epidemic. The globalization of 20-year medicine patents which occurred with the creation of the 
World Trade Organization in 1994 triggered opposition and challenges to the innovation patent 
model. Economists and NGOs now vie with each other in proposing ways of reconciling 
innovation and access to treatment. 
 
]k[Keywords: AIDS; globalization; human rights; pharmaceuticals; public health 
 
]p[The health field is a locus of strong tension between private appropriation of innovations and 
access to them, between the payment of a monopoly rent and calls for a “right to health” or a 
“right to life” (Foucault 1976). In 2001, for instance, the organization Treatment Access 
Campaign advocated for “Patent rights against patients’ rights” in South Africa. Pharmaceuticals 
is the industry with the most patents on its innovations (Mansfield 1986), and the one whose 
patenting practices are challenged the most by the state and civil society. Even though patents 
reward the inventor’s efforts and merit, and are indeed an incentive to research and industry, in 
the health field patenting has to come to terms with people’s right to health, with states’ public 
health objectives, and with the ethics of doctors who tend to oppose any impediment to their 
activity due to the existence of patents. 
 
]a[The Long History of Exceptions to Patents 
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]p[The history of patents in the health field is marked by opposition and exceptions to exclusive 
property rights. The first French law on invention patents in 1791 extended patents to “all kinds 
of industry,” including pharmaceuticals. In 1810, however, the state set up a system of public 
procurement of medicine inventions, in parallel with patents. The formulas bought by the state 
were to be put into the public domain to further the advancement of knowledge and to satisfy 
public health needs by “increasing the means useful to the art of healing.” Thus, during the first 
half of the nineteenth century in France, two systems of property rights existed for medicines. 
With the reform of the patent law in 1844, parliament decided, against the government’s initial 
recommendation, to exclude medicines from patenting. The idea was to ensure that the granting 
of patents did not facilitate trade in fraudulent remedies developed by charlatans. It was also to 
prevent the creation of monopolies on essential goods: “Based on the law and common sense 
there is incompatibility between a pharmaceutical composition that is useful for humanity and an 
exclusive exploitation for the profit of a single interest” (Parliament, Le Moniteur Universel, 
1843). The non-patentability of medicines led to the copying of foreign patents, primarily 
German patents, and the constitution of a modern pharmaceutical industry including, notably, 
the firm Rhône-Poulenc. In the early twentieth century this firm undertook the systematic 
copying of German patents in collaboration with the Pasteur Institute. This regime of non-
patentability lasted in France until 1959, when a “special medicines patent” was created, and 
finally, medicines fell under common patent law in 1968. 
In North America as a whole, there was strong opposition to patents within medical 
associations and university medical faculties, although the law had authorized medicine patents 
since the late eighteenth century. The 1847 code of ethics of the American Medical Association 
condemned patenting by doctors or scientists: “Equally derogatory to professional character is it, 
for a physician to hold a patent for any surgical instrument, or medicine” (Swann 1988). When 
doctors at Toronto University discovered insulin in the early 1920s, the norm of private non-
appropriation of pharmaceutical inventions was soundly entrenched in the academic world – 
apart from a few mavericks like E. C. Kendall (Rasmussen 2004). The University of Toronto 
eventually decided to file for patents on the new pancreatic extract that it had isolated and on the 
extraction and purification processes that it had developed, not to derive an innovation rent but 
as a means to have control over industry. More precisely, the university wanted to control the 
quality, price, and accessibility of insulin for patients. In the early 1920s it set up a collective 
management of these patents in the form of a patent pool that was to bring together all patents 
on insulin preparations until the 1950s. While the patenting of insulin by the University of 
Toronto facilitated changes in academics’ norms with regard to patents during the interwar 
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period, the fact of doctors or university researchers filing for patents was justified at the time by 
the aim of controlling the exploitation of medicines in the public interest, rather than transferring 
university research (JAMA 1939). Debate on medicine patents reappeared in the USA at the end 
of the 1950s, after an anti-trust inquiry into the pharmaceutical industry, conducted by Senator 
Estes Kefauver. In order to reduce the price of medicines, he proposed a steep decrease in the 
length of the right to exclusive exploitation granted to patent holders. While the validity of 
patents was still 17 years, the exclusive right to ownership of medicine patents would be cut to 
three years, at the end of which patent holders would have to grant licenses to other firms, in 
exchange for royalties. In case of deadlock, the senator recommended the granting of a 
compulsory license, which permits a third party to use a patent without the owner’s 
authorization. The Association of the Pharmaceutical Industry vehemently opposed this bill and 
highlighted the discoveries of American research. In the end President John Kennedy rejected 
the bill. Research by economist Frederic Scherer has shown, however, that on several occasions 
in the 1950s and 1960s, the US government used anti-trust legislation to break up monopolies in 
the health field (Scherer 2000). Debate on compulsory licenses was triggered again in the USA in 
autumn 2001 during the anthrax crisis. Congressmen and women engaged in campaigns for 
access to medicines petitioned the government to suspend Bayer’s patent on Cipro and to 
authorize generic medicine producers to manufacture and supply antibiotics for the National 
Pharmaceutical Reserve. However, the state secretary for health eventually excluded the option of 
generic medicines and endorsed the incentive role and legitimacy of the patent system. 
In the early 1970s two large emergent countries, India and Brazil, decided to exclude 
pharmaceutical substances from patenting. In Brazil, neither pharmaceutical products nor 
processes were patentable, while in India, seven-year process patents were still applicable. The 
fact that pharmaceutical products were being placed in the public domain facilitated the copying 
of international patents and the upsurge of a powerful generic medicine industry, especially in 
India. 
 
]a[The Impossibility of Normalizing Patents in the Health Field 
]p[While medicines could not be patented in Brazil, India, and many other countries of the global 
South, the patent model has tended to be consolidated in Europe and Japan. Patents on 
pharmaceutical products were authorized in France in 1960, in Germany in 1968, in Japan in 
1976, in Italy in 1978, and in Spain and Sweden in 1992. The extension of the patent model was 
justified by the steep rise in the cost of research and development and the need for firms to 
recoup their investments in developing a medicine. Scherer (1998) estimated this cost at US$98 
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million per medicine in 1980, including clinical research and failures. Grabovski (2002) pointed 
out the increase in the number and size of clinical trials in the 1990s, and put forward the figure 
of US$400 million for the late 1990s. The 1980s and 1990s were marked by a vigorous offensive 
in the United States and large innovating countries to reinforce the patent system on a global 
scale and to close the space that had been opened for copying in Brazil and especially in India. In 
1997 the US Academy of Science published the report America’s Vital Interest in Global Health: 
Protecting Our People, Enhancing Our Economy and Advancing Our National Interest (Institute of 
Medicine 1997). The authors of this report denounced China’s and India’s “pirating” and 
recommended the strengthening of intellectual property (IP) rights on a global scale. In the 
meantime, in 1994 signature of the trade-related intellectual property rights (TRIPS) defined the 
new intellectual property norms set out in the agreements of the World Trade Organization, 
created in 1994 – agreement had been set as a condition for the WTO’s adoption of 20-year 
patents on medicines. 
Paradoxically, the globalization of 20-year medicine patents via the WTO precipitated 
opposition and challenges to the intellectual property rights model. The AIDS epidemic, more 
than others, triggered the creation of social movements advocating access to treatment, which 
intervened directly in the intellectual property rights field. From 1996, Act Up demanded “Access 
for All” to tri-therapies for HIV/AIDS. In 1998 Médecins sans Frontières (MSF) launched its 
campaign for access to essential medicines. In 2001 a cartel of 38 international pharmaceutical 
firms challenged the South African government over a clause in the country’s new law on 
medicines, authorizing imports of generic versions of patented medicines from countries where 
prices were lower. The Pretoria trial was a key event in the confrontation between the “right to 
health” and patent rights. Faced with strong mobilization by NGOs and public opinion, 
international pharmaceutical firms eventually withdrew the charges. They did nevertheless obtain 
an undertaking from the South African government that it would not use compulsory licenses to 
produce patented medicines locally, unless authorization was obtained from the patent owner. 
In November 2001 the WTO, under pressure from India, Brazil, and certain NGOs, 
signed a declaration in Doha on intellectual property and public health. It recognized the right of 
states to use flexibilities in the TRIPS agreements, especially the possibility of using patents 
without authorization from the holders, in situations of public health crisis: “we affirm that the 
Agreement can and should be interpreted and implemented in a manner supportive of WTO 
members’ right to protect public health and, in particular, to promote access to medicines for 
all.” In 2005 the TRIPS agreements were amended to introduce compulsory licenses for exports 
to and imports from countries that did not have a local pharmaceutical industry. While these 
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measures were complex in practice, they did ratify the possibility of building a generic medicines 
market to cover the public health needs defined by states. 
The 2000s were marked by decisions taken by countries of the South to implement 
compulsory licenses, whereas until then such decisions had been taken only by countries of the 
North (Scherer 2000). Compulsory licenses were decreed in Thailand in 2006 and then Brazil in 
2007, following intense mobilization by civil society and local health ministries. In Brazil the state 
president authorized the local production of Efavirenz, an AIDS anti-retroviral (ARV), for “a 
public non-commercial use.” The aim was to supply Brazil’s national AIDS programme which 
distributed these medicines freely to patients (Cassier and Correa 2008). In Brazil and India, 
sometimes jointly, patient organizations and generics laboratories initiated opposition procedures 
to obtain the cancellation of certain patents. In 2008 this opposition resulted in patents on 
Tenofovir, another HIV/AIDS ARV, falling into the public domain, in both India and Brazil. 
Generic drugs producers in these two countries can now produce freely. In India an opposition 
procedure initiated by a cancer patient organization and several generic drugs producers resulted 
in cancellation of Novartis’s patent on Glivec, in the name of public health. This decision was 
upheld on appeal: “Thus, we also observe that a grant of product patent on this application can 
create havoc to the lives of poor people and their families affected with the cancer for which this 
medicine is effective. This will have a disastrous effect on society as well” (Novartis v. Union of 
India, Intellectual Property Appellate Board, may 2009). On 3rd april 2013, The Supreme Court 
of India confirmed the rejection of the Novartis patent on Glivec (Novartis v. Union of India, 
Supreme Court of India, april 2013).  
The normalization and globalization of medicine patents triggered an increase in 
intervention by governments and citizens to regulate intellectual property and access to 
treatment. The AIDS epidemic and campaigns for access to essential treatment also had the 
effect of shifting these interventions to countries of the South. President Lula’s decree on a 
compulsory license was the first of its kind in Brazil. In parallel, the 2000s witnessed strong 
mobilization by doctor and patient organizations, and by some countries in Europe as well as 
Canada, the United States, and Australia, against patents and commercial monopolies on genes 
and on breast cancer genetic predisposition tests. 
 
]a[Solutions to Reconcile Patents and Public Health 
]p[Despite citizens’ and states’ intervention to secure access to medicines – via the demand for 
compulsory licenses or the initiation of opposition procedures – tensions for access to treatment 
increased following the gradual closure of the copying industry in India and Brazil as these 
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countries granted patents on new molecules (from 1997 in Brazil and 2005 in India). Whereas 
generic copies of the first HIV/AIDS ARVs had made it possible to broaden the scope of access 
to treatment, the prices of new generations of patented ARVs is now threatening that progress. 
Several solutions have been put forward to widen accessibility of patented medicines: 
grants for research and development on neglected diseases, and no royalties or very low rates for 
developing countries (Grabovski 2002); suspension of patent rights in countries of the South 
when the firm had filed a patent in a country of the North (Lanjouwe 2002); purchase of 
patented inventions by an international organization that would then put them in the public 
domain (Kremer 1998); and encouragement of developing countries to use all the flexibilities of 
medicine patent laws to reduce the scope of monopolies (Correa 2007). MSF and then 
UNITAID proposed the creation of a patent pool containing all ARV patents. The idea was to 
facilitate the development of combinations of molecules and the distribution of licenses to all 
manufacturers who requested them. At this stage the patent pool created by UNITAID in 2008, 
on the basis of voluntary contributions by firms, has received patents from only national 
institutes of health sciences (NIHs) and the firm Gilead. We recall that during World War II, the 
US government was able to demand that firms engage in contracts with the Office of Scientific 
Research and Development distribute non-exclusive licenses on their patents to other contracting 
parties. At the time, the US and British governments agreed to form a patent pool for inventions 
relating to penicillin. 
Several actors have proposed a system of automatic compulsory licenses such as the one 
applied in Canada in the 1970s, or that envisaged by Senator Kefauver at the end of the 1950s in 
the United States. Between 1969 and 1992, the Canadian patent authorities granted no fewer than 
613 compulsory licenses authorizing the importation of patented pharmaceutical material for 
producing generic medicines locally. The Canadian medicines were 50 percent cheaper than those 
patented in the United States. This system was abolished in 1992 and replaced by a control on 
medicine prices. Note that compulsory licenses do not cancel the intellectual property rights of 
patent holders. Instead, the rate of royalties is lower (1.5% for the compulsory license on 
Efavirenz in Brazil) and the patent holder loses the right to exclusive exploitation. 
New solutions have appeared in the field of neglected diseases. We know that the 
proprietary innovation model has turned away from diseases found mostly in poor populations, 
and from “tropical” diseases. Between 1975 and 1999, only 0.1 percent of all new chemical 
entities were intended for tropical diseases (Trouiller 2002). In 2002 a consortium initiated by 
Médecins sans Frontières and administered by the DNDI (Drugs for Neglected Diseases 
Initiative) launched a pharmaceutical innovation project to design new combinations of 
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molecules against malaria. This consortium was based on a technological development model 
shared between the North (the University of Bordeaux in partnership with a start-up and Sanofi 
Aventis) and the South (the federal pharmaceutical laboratory Farmanguinhos in Brazil). The 
DNDI imposed a policy of non-patenting of the new medicines obtained. Two new drug 
combinations developed in 2006, ASAQ and ASMQ, are now produced by a laboratory in 
Morocco and by the generic drugs producer Cipla in India. These firms use technology transfers 
between France and Morocco, and between Brazil and India. In 2009 the WHO’s World Health 
Assembly recognized the necessity to work on innovative solutions as alternatives to the patent 
system, despite much resistance, primarily from the United States which opposed WHO 
involvement in this type of process (Velasquez 2011). 
 
SEE ALSO: Biopolitics; Biopolitics and Biological Citizenship; Drugs: Public Policy; Health and 
Globalization; Health Care Delivery System: Brazil; Health, Political Economy of; HIV/AIDS, 
Health Services Utilization Among People Living with; Pharmaceutical Industries 
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